As the Cabinet prepares for a decision on November 21, the general account expenditures of this fiscal year’s supplementary budget are expected to exceed JPY 17 trillion. Centered on measures to address rising prices, growth-oriented investment, and national security, this will be a large-scale supplementary budget surpassing last year’s JPY 13.9 trillion. There are reportedly voices within the ruling coalition calling for an even larger package. However, a supplementary budget is originally intended to make limited and necessary adjustments in response to unforeseen and urgent situations such as natural disasters. Industrial policy and defense strategy as medium- to long-term national priorities are, by nature, not matters that should be addressed through a “supplementary” framework.

From the second Abe administration to the Ishiba administration, supplementary budgets have been enacted 13 times, with total national expenditures amounting to approximately JPY 250 trillion. Even excluding those enacted during (or in response to) the COVID-19 pandemic, the total still exceeds JPY 106 trillion. Measures such as emergency economic measures for revitalizing the Japanese economy, economic measures to realize investment for the future, economic measures to extend virtuous cycles to local economies, and comprehensive economic measures to create a future with security and growth already suggest a departure from the original intent of a “supplementary” budget. Nevertheless, the cumulative result of repeatedly implementing such emergency measures is what we see today. Have they amounted merely to broad-based, temporary income support across all segments of the population? I strongly urge a thorough evaluation of their outcomes.

Leaving aside the theoretical debate over what a supplementary budget should be, the most pressing issue at present is rising prices—and this is the first major hurdle. The Bank of Japan  seeks to normalize interest rates in order to achieve a stable landing from the aftereffects of Abenomics (the large-scale monetary easing and fiscal stimulus introduced under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe). Meanwhile, the current administration, while prefacing its stance as “responsible,” is said to favor active fiscal spending and the continuation of monetary easing. These positions are fundamentally at odds. When markets perceive that the timing of interest rate hikes by the Bank of Japan may be delayed, they react immediately: the yen depreciates sharply against the U.S. dollar, and concerns over confidence in the yen intensify.

Added to this is the risk posed by China. The response by Chinese authorities to recent remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi goes beyond the level of ordinary diplomatic friction, and the impact on the Japanese economy is not insignificant. At the same time, Japanese companies should have advanced structural reforms through experiences such as the Senkaku Islands issue (a territorial dispute between Japan and China) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Their crisis-response capabilities have improved, and it is important to respond calmly with a long-term perspective.

In Japan during the early 1940s, it was the media and opinion leaders of the time who aligned themselves with government-imposed controls on speech, inflamed exclusionary nationalism, and helped manufacture public enthusiasm for war. We must once again recognize, each and every one of us, the fragility of democracy and strive to preserve a healthy space for public discourse.

Finally, I hope that the Takaichi administration will embody what former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba emphasized as the pride and responsibility of a politician who does not yield to irresponsible populism or simply go along with the prevailing tide (from his statement on 80 years since the end of the war).

Takashi Mizukoshi, the President
This Week’s Focus, November 16–20, 2025