On April 14, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications announced that the country’s total population as of October 1, 2024—including foreign nationals—stood at 123.802 million, marking a year-on-year decrease of 550,000 (0.44%) people. The natural decrease (the number of deaths exceeding births) reached a record-high 890,000. The Japanese population alone declined by 898,000 (0.74%) to 120.296 million, while the number of foreign residents rose by 342,000 (9.8%) to 3.506 million. Although the number of foreign residents is rising, it is still not enough to offset the overall population decline.

Tokyo has the largest share of the national population, at 11.5%, followed by Kanagawa (7.5%), Osaka (7.1%), Aichi (6.0%), Saitama (5.9%), and Chiba (5.0%). The Tokyo metropolitan area, including Tokyo and three surrounding prefectures, accounts for 29.9% of the population, while the combined metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Aichi make up 43.0%. The concentration of population in urban areas remains unchanged. The demographic shift towards an aging population continues, with the proportion of those under 15 years old at a record low of 11.2% (down 343,000 from the previous year), and those aged 65 and over at a record high of 29.3% (up 17,000). Notably, the proportion of those aged 75 and over has reached 16.8% (up 700,000).

In response, local governments are competing to curb population decline by promoting migration, settlement, support for child-rearing, and distinctive local initiatives. Despite these efforts, only Tokyo and Saitama recorded population increases at the prefectural level—and in both cases, the growth was due to social increase. In other words, net migration from other regions outweighed the natural decrease. Tokyo's strong appeal as the capital and its relatively generous child-related policies have contributed to this trend. Nevertheless, even Tokyo saw a 17% decrease in marriages in 2023 compared to 2019 (the national average was a 21% decrease), indicating that reversing the natural decline remains challenging.

This is not to argue against local initiatives or inter-regional competition. However, internal migration cannot increase the national total. This structure is similar to Furusato Nozei, the hometown tax donation system, which has indeed generated a flow of resources from urban to rural areas. While some municipalities have benefited individually, the total funding available for public services has declined when accounting for the cost of return gifts and the compensation for lost revenue through local allocation tax grants.

Japan’s fertility rate fell below the population replacement level of 2.07 in 1974. The current crisis is the outcome of half a century of insufficient action. Looking ahead, Japan’s population is projected to fall to around 87 million by 2075. Now more than ever, we must look beyond immediate regional competition and start building comprehensive, long-term policies rooted in the question: What kind of society should Japan aim to be 50 years from now?

This Week’s Focus, 4.13 – 4.17
Takashi Mizukoshi, the President